W sprawie pobytu Józefa Piłsudskiego i Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego w twierdzach Wesel i Magdeburga, s. 1-6
After their arrest in July 1917, J. Piłsudski and K. Sosnkowski were detained in a prison in Gdańsk, from which they were transferred to Spandau near Berlin, and on 6 August incarcerated in the Wesel fortress on the Rhine. Archival material shows that the initially harsh conditions were not so much a form of harassment on the part of the German authorities, but due to the fact that the prison was overflowing. Later, the two inmates were placed in officer cells, and permitted to use the prison library and read the local press. These changes were the outcome of a routine visit paid in Wesel on 8 August by Colonel Baron Liliencron, inspector of military penal institutions. The need to keep close watch on both important prisoners, and to render impossible all attempts to escape, led the German authorities to the conclusion that Wesel was unsuitable. Consequently, the inmates were transferred to Magdeburg, where Piłsudski was interned in the local citadel and Sosnkowski in a prison of a higher military court.
Polityka bolszewików wobec niepodległej Gruzji w latach 1918-1921, s. 7-21
The intention of the article was to present policy pursued by Soviet Russia towards the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which existed in the Caucasus from the end of May 1918 to the middle of March 1921. The significance of Georgia and other Caucasian states as sources of raw materials as well as their role as hinterland for the Volunteer Army fighting against the Red Army were the reason why during the entire period under examination Moscow conducted an active policy vis a vis Tbilisi. Its goal was to include Georgia (and the Caucuses as a whole) into the orbit of Soviet influence. Attempts in achieving this aim assumed a twofold character . First, they entailed the official diplomatic endeavours of the Soviet authorities. After a period of a non-recognition of Georgia by Soviet Russia, the two states initiated political relations in Soviet-Georgian peace treaty signed on 7 May 1920. Certain clauses provided convenient foundations for subjugating Tbilisi to the Soviet authorities. This purpose was also served by second, unofficial currant of Moscow policy which consisted in expending Soviet impact throughout the country by supporting Bolshevik organisations functioning in Georgia. The intensification their activity was assisted by founding the Communists Party of Georgia, whose leaders cooperated closely with the central bodies of the Russian Communists Party (Bolsheviks). The undertakings of the Georgian communists were reflected in an extended propaganda campaign in Georgia and unsuccessful efforts to organise armed combat directed against state authorities. These form of activity enjoyed the unofficial support of Soviet diplomats in Tbilisi. Ultimately, the Russia striving at subjecting Georgia was expressed in the establishment of Soviet power in March 1921, preceded by an antigovernment uprising inspired by communists activists. The necessity of aiding the insurgents was only a pretext for an open intervention of the Red Army and the toppling of the democratic government in Tbilisi. The outline process of the Sovietisation of Georgia was typical for Bolshevik policies towards the former Russian borderlands.
Stany Zjednoczone w oczach endecji w latach 1919-1939, s. 23-29
The National Democracy, described also as "endecja" or the national camp, was
the largest right-wing orientation in the Second Republic during the 1919-1939 period. Up
to 1926, it played a dominating part in Polish political life. Deprived of power in the
wake of the May coup d'etat carried out by Józef Piłsudski, it still had at its disposal
an extensive propaganda apparatus, with whose assistance it exerted a strong impact on the
consciousness of Polish society.
The image of the United Stats of America depicted in the political thought of the National Democracy was decidedly negative. One could even hazard the view that the National Democrats envisaged the United State as the embodiment of evil. "Endecja" publicists ascribed to the American nation multiple negative features and charged it with a departure from religious values and basing its lifestyle exclusively on competition for material gains. At the same time, the Americans were regarded as wasteful and hapless victims of advertisement slogans. The American nation was accused of lacking creative individualism. Prime reasons for social evil were sought in an excessive development of industry, a process which was to produce universal standardisation and civilisational degeneration. Finally, pro-German inclinations were sought in American foreign policy. At times, "endecja" publications presented the United States as a potential opponent of Poland, and a possible Polish-American alliance was not foreseen
Bogusław W. Winid,
Robert Lansing a Polska. Zapomniana karta stosunków polsko-amerykańskich, s. 31-46
Robert Lansing held the post of Secretary of State in the Woodrow Wilson administration
from 1915 to 1920. In this capacity, he dealt upon numerous occasions with questions
concerning Poland, conducted talks with Polish politicians, and made diplomatic decisions
of essential importance from the Polish point of view. Nonetheless, in the history of
Polish-American relations he remains overshadowed by President Wilson and his chief
political adviser, Colonel Edward House, although Lansing's part was equally significant
and his attitude towards Polish issues was frequently more favourable than that of the two
men. Some of his unrealised political conceptions would have been more profitable for
Poland than those contained in the Versailles Treaty. The role performed by Robert Lansing
in Polish-American relations, today forgotten, requires to be assessed anew.
Lansing supported the formation of Polish troops in France, and, in contrast to other members of the Wilson administration, did not object to recruitment conducted on United States territory. In mid-1917, he proposed the establishment of a provisional Polish government in New York. When the implementation of this project proved to be impossible, he led to the recognition of the National Committee in Paris as the official representative of a future independent Poland.
Both during preparations for the peace conference in Paris and in the course of its duration, Lansing often advocated the acceptance of territorial solutions conducive for Poland. He was one of the few members of the American delegation to support, among others, the granting of Gdańsk and, after certain hesitations, of Eastern Galicia to Poland. Unfortunately for the Polish side, the impact exerted by the Secretary of State upon concrete political decisions diminished almost proportionately to the increase of his interest in, and support for the Polish point of view. In February 1920, a growing conflict with President Wilson led to a widely publicised dismissal of the Secretary of State.
Słabnące lobby. Działalność propolskich grup parlamentarnych we francuskim Zgromadzeniu Narodowym w latach 1921-1936, s. 47-62
En 1921, Louis Marin et Kazimierz Rakowski ont créé ŕ la Chambre des Députés le
Groupe parlementaire des Amis de la Pologne. Sur la liste des 93 membres fondateurs
figurent des députés de l' Union Républicaine, Radicaux, Républicains-Socialistes. Au
1er janvier 1922, le groupe compte 180 membres, en mai 1922, 200 membres.
Le point crucial pour son activité est l' année 1921. La question polonaise est ŕ l' ordre du jour. Les débats parlementaires concernant la Haute-Silésie ont eu lieu dans la période 24-26 mai 1921. Une douzaine de députés dont F. Regaud, H. Lorin, G. Saget effectuent un voyage en Haute-Silésie. Ils reviennent persuadés que "le pangermanisme n'a point desarmé et qu' un des articles essentiels du traité de paix, c' est que le droit de tous nos alliés dans l' espece d' aujourd'hui celui de nos alliés de Pologne, doit ętre sauvegardé".
L'année 1925 apparaît comme un moment instituant une nouvelle phase dans les rapports franco-polonais aprčs la victoire du Cartel des gauches en 1924. L' entrée en scčne du cabinet d' Edouard Herriot entraîne du côté français un changement sensible dans la politique étrangčre de la France (liée au rapprochement franco-allemand). Locarno en est exemple. Les députés socialistes effectuent, en février 1925 un voyage ŕ Varsovie afin de rencontrer ses homologues polonais. En conséquence de cette visite ils fondent le 8 novembre 1925 un Groupe parlementaire franco-polonais, rival de l'autre. Au 1er janvier celui-ci compte 220 membres contre 100 pour le groupe parlementaire des Amis de la Pologne, qui se proclame désormais afin de se démarquer "compose des seuls députés qui veulent resolument l'alliance de la France et de la Pologne. Le presidé par Louis Marin défend des positions politiques fermes, tandis que son concurrent cherche ŕ anéantir cette alliance.
Modernizacja policji w Polsce 1935-1939, s. 63-76
In the mid-1930s, the Second Republic, a country with a vast territory, with a
population whose one-third was composed of national minorities (partially hostile towards
Polish statehood,) and full of social unrest, had one of the lowest coefficients of police
presence in Europe. Additionally, the small police force was technically backward,
similarly to the whole country. In this situation, it was necessary to modernise and amend
the effectiveness of the force, which otherwise would be incapable of fulfilling its
In 1935, the newly appointed Chief of Police was General Zamorski, a person who enjoyed great influence among the governing circles. He put these contacts to full use in order to achieve a radical improvement in the functioning of the police. A number of changes were introduced into the organisation of the force, the most important concerning recruitment which made it possible to establish motorised reserve units, composed of candidates to the force. Other reforms affected the training system and expanded the role of women officers. Considerable significance was also attached to concern with the satisfactory physical condition of the police officers.
Equally important was the increase of technical equipment and in particular the inauguration of motorisation. This initiative was made possible by a six-year plan for the modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces, realised from 1936, which foresaw funds for police technical equipment. It was envisaged that in case of war the police force would become part of the army.
The modernised police was modelled on British and German examples. The German experiences were regarded as particularly impressive since the increased rights enjoyed by the police enabled a more effective struggle against crime and the political opposition.
Changes in organisation and facilities were accompanied by a wide-range propaganda campaign aimed at convincing Polish society about the prominent and positive function of the force.
From the point of view of the authorities, the modernised police became a much more efficient formation, some of whose accomplishments were highly regarded also abroad.
Socjaliści we Francji w 1939-1940 r., s. 77-88
At the turn of 1939, a group of members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) left Poland
and made its way to France. The exiles included: Alojzy Adamczyk, Józef Beluch-Beloński,
Adam and Lidia Ciołkosz, Ludwik Grosfeld, Adam Pragier, Jan Stańczyk, and Tadeusz
Tomaszewski. In January 1940, they established in Paris a socialist organisation,
described a month later as the Central Executive Committee of the PPS in Exile (CKW PPS
Zagranicą), whose leaders were A. Adamczyk, A. and L. Ciołkosz, K. Grosfeld, Herman
Lieberman (chairman), J. Stańczyk, and T. Tomaszewski.
CKW PPS Zagranicą split into two groups. Members of the first included A. and L. Ciołkosz and T. Tomaszewski, and those of second - L. Grosfeld, H. Lieberman, and J. Stańczyk. Differences between the two groups concerned accounts with the "sanacja", assessments of the activity pursued by General W. Sikorski, and the attitude towards underground groups emerging in occupied Poland. From January 1940, Polish socialists in France published a periodical entitled "Robotnik we Francji". They established contacts with the Socialist Workersą International, created their own foreign representations, such as the Representation of the Central Trade Union Commission Abroad or the Representation of PPS Youth Abroad, and expanded the PPS Section, already working in France. In 1939, J. Stańczyk was appointed Minister of Social Welfare in the first Polish government-in- exile, headed by General W. Sikorski. Former PPS activists co-founded the National Council of the Polish Republic, whose members included A. Adamczyk, H. Lieberman, J. Szczerbiński, and T. Tomaszewski (soon replaced by A. Ciołkosz). The socialists prepared two programme documents. The first pertains to the national minorities in post-war Poland and contains postulates of equal rights and extensive self-government. The second document deals with Polish domestic and foreign policy and the newly established Polish armed forces in France. Emphasis is placed on a slogan of the primacy of underground organisations in occupied Poland in relation to the legal-political structures in exile.
Procedura aneksji przez ZSRR wschodnich ziem II Rzeczypospolitej w 1939 r., s. 89-112
The author presents the course of particular stages in a legal procedure whose
intention was the legalisation of the annexation of part of Polish territory. He found
that already on 1 October 1939, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) confirmed a detailed scenario for suitable
undertakings, and entrusted its realisation to appropriate local occupation authorities.
By creating the illusion of a roots initiative, the authorities in Lwów and Białystok
embarked upon the organisation of elections to People's Congresses of Western Ukraine and
Western Belarus. The Communist party controlled both the selection of candidates for
deputies and members of election committees; it also imposed the contents of the election
campaign, banning all independent effort. Voting on 22 October 1939 took place in an
atmosphere of fear, with no opportunities for actual political choices (one candidate per
single seat) and controlling the outcome. Sessions of both people's congresses, held at
the end of October 1939, were a mere spectacle staged by the ruling party. In accordance
with party decisions, the debates ended with a proclamation of the confiscation of large
landed estate and the nationalisation of banks and industry on territories under Soviet
occupation. Subsequently, empowered delegations of both congresses set out for Moscow for
an extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union (31 October - 2
November 1939,), which accepted their requests to incorporate occupied Polish lands into
the Soviet Union. In mid-November 1939, the republican parliaments of Ukraine and Belarus
convened for the same purpose; they too, supported the motion of the authorized
The author vividly outlines the legal fiction of the elections, the class and national (anti-Polish) tone of the debates held by particular representative bodies, and the propaganda significance of the incorporation procedure. He concludes that the latter was a negation of a chance for the interested parties to make unhampered decisions about their future fate.
Polskie obozy odosobnienia we Francji i w Wielkiej Brytanii w latach 1939-1942, s. 113-127
After the assumption of power in September 1939, General Sikorski, at the advise of his coworkers and political friends, agreed to create in France an internment camp for representatives of the previous regime. This decision was favoured by an atmosphere of universal charges of a defeat unprecedented in the history of the Polish state; attempts were made to isolate the accused from further impact upon the states authorities and the army in exile. The first camp was opened in Cerizay in western France. Its assorted military and civilian functions. The majority were mobilised in their capacity as officers, and therefore the only solution was to opt for an army recourse. The Cerizay centre was not a camp in the strict meaning of the term, and did not include barracks and guards. The officers lived in private accommodations, hotels and lodging houses, but were forbidden to leave the town and were obligated to report daily to the camp commander - Colonel Rumsza, a trusted officer of General Sikorski. During the French period, the camp haused 69 persons. After the defeat of France, it was not evacuated but dissolved. Nonetheless, most the interned men found their way to Great Britain, were the problem of isolating them from the rest of the Polish armed forces reappeared. The detainess were provisionally kept in the Rangers stadium in Glasgow and subsequently in an officers camp in Douglas; their ultimate place of interment was the island of Bute on the coast of Scotland. Here, in comparison with the situation in France, the centre was expanded considerably. Due to the fact that Bute also lacked barracks, barbed wire fencing, etc., the main place of detention was the seaside resort town of Rothesay. The inmates included persons charged with crimes and misdemeanours, as well as soldiers not required as that particular stage of training (sappers) but primarily persons inconvenient for members of the General Sikorski government. Cases of intimating opponents by warning them of imminent exile to Bute were quite frequent. Other immates were even persons who committed slight misdeeds while serving in the armed troops as well as those sentenced for no reason whatsoever. The Piłsudskiites interned on the island tried to organise themselves and maintain contacts with their colleagues, which was a considerable feat considerng the careful censorship of all correspondence. Nonetheless, a so-called political group composed of high ranking representatives of the "sanacja" preserved links with the outside world. Throughout the entire period of the functioning of the camp, it served the interment of about 1500 officers, including 20 generals. An end to its existence was put by an interpolation in the Hause of Commons by Labour MPs. The Polish chief command was compelled to liquidate the camp. The majority of officers were enlisted into the Polish armed forces, and the rest - the oldest - were left in Rothesay but in an entirely different character.
ZSRR wobec projektów konfederacji polsko-czechosłowackiej (1940-1943), s. 129-153
General Władysław Sikorski, who on 30 September 1939 became the head of the
government of the Polish Republic in exile, maintained that one of the pillars of the
postwar security of Poland was a new configuration of relations in Central Europe, based
on a Polish-Czechoslovak conference envisaged as a fragment and integral part of
federative relations between free and democratic states. In his opinion, only such a
configuration would separate the Soviet Union and Germany permanently and effectively.
President Eduard Benes also perceived federations as an effective instrument for the
reconstruction of relations in Europe. Despite this general concurrence of opinions held
by both politicians, there occurred assorted differences, the most important being their
attitude to the political role of the Soviet Union. Already prior to 22 June 1941, Benes
claimed that the war could not be won without the participation of the Red Army, which, in
turn, would denote a definition of the role to be played by Moscow in postwar Europe; he
also declared that conditions for the security of the Continent and international
cooperation could not be conceived realistically without Soviet presence. Sikorski, on the
other hand, expressed the view that all issues would be resolved by Great Britain,
assisted by the United States.
Moscow analysed carefully the policies pursued by Sikorski and Benes, and treated Polish-Czechoslovak rapprochement as a threat to its own plans. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Stalin initially did not protest against projects for a Polish-Czechoslovak conference, and in his talks with A. Eden (December 1941) even seemed to reveal a favourable stand towards plans of postwar European federations, albeit under certain conditions. At the same time, Soviet diplomats tried to make full use of the differences between Sikorski and Benes. The presented article examines the diplomatic activity of the Kremlin, and especially of Alexander Bogomolov, the Soviet ambassador to the emigre governments in London, who resorted to every possible method (which the article discusses in great detail) to influence the mode of thinking and conduct of President Benes and his closest political entourage.
The endeavours made by Moscow proved to be successful although they were conducted by means of small steps, which only from the summer of 1942 became increasingly larger. Ultimately, at the end of 1942, Polish-Soviet and Polish-Czechoslovak differences, the pressure exerted by the Kremlin, with minimum counteraction on the part of the British, and Czechoslovak initiative put a halt to negotiations about a future Polish-Czechoslovak conference, which at the beginning of 1943 already became part of a non-retrievable past. The idea of a new arrangement of relations in postwar Central Europe, in the version proposed by General Sikorski, was shattered. The victorious conception formulated by Stalin aimed at transforming this region into a zone of Soviet domination. Stalin skillfully exploited Polish-Czechoslovak differences, although Benes remained under the impression that his own policy was fully independent and stemmed from the raison d'etat and interests of Czechoslovakia.
Jerzy Z. Pająk,
Centralny Komitet Narodowy w latach 1915-1917, s. 155-164
Przesiedlenie obywateli polskich z ziem wschodnich RP w głąb ZSRR w latach 1939-1941, losy przesiedleńców do roku 1946, s. 165-170
Agnieszka J. Cieślik,
Prasa w okupowanym Lwowie 1939-1944, s. 171-177
Polacy we Lwowie pod okupacją radziecką i niemiecką w latach 1939-1944. Życie codzienne, s. 179-182
Spółdzielczość ukraińska w Galicji w okresie II wojny światowej, s. 183-187
Mieczysław Moczar - biografia polityczna, s. 189-192
Wywiad KG AK i polityka krajowa NW gen. Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego w 1944 r. w świetle listu Kazimierza Iranka-Osmeckiego, s. 193-206